This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant strategy implementable allocation rule, there is a unique payment rule that can implement it; and (3) we show that every dominant strategy incentive compatible, individually rational, and revenue-maximizing mechanism must charge zero payment for the worst alternative (outside option). These results are applicable in a wide variety of problems (single object auction, multiple object auction, public good provision etc.) under suitable richness of type space. In particular, our results are applicable to two important type spaces: (a) type space containing an arbitrarily small perturbation of quasilinear type space and (b) type space containing all positive income effect preferences.
Introduction
We analyze a model of mechanism design with transfers where preferences of agents over transfers are not necessarily quasilinear. We assume agents have classical preferences over the set of consumption bundles, where a consumption bundle consists of an alternative and a transfer amount. A preference (type) is classical if it is monotone and continuous in transfers.
We provide results that cover a variety of important problems: the single object auction problem, the multi-object auction problem, the public good provision problem and so on.
If the type space satisfies a richness property, we provide a simple monotonicity condition that along with a posted-price property, is necessary and sufficient for a mechanism to be (dominant strategy) incentive compatible. The posted-price property requires the payment decisions at various types to agree whenever the allocation decisions at these types agree.
Further, we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every implementable allocation rule, there is a unique payment rule such that the corresponding mechanism is incentive compatible. Though we do not have revenue equivalence in our model, our results can be interpreted as a counterpart of the monotonicity and revenue equivalence results with quasilinearity.
There are at least two important type spaces where our results apply. Let Q be the set of all quasilinear preferences in some standard problem. The first example of a type space where our results apply is any superset of Q containing "small perturbations" of types in Q.
Our second example is a type space containing all positive income effect preferences.
We study the implications of individual rationality without quasilinearity. Recall that a straightforward consequence of revenue equivalence in quasilinear environment is that a revenue maximizing, incentive compatible, and individually rational mechanism charges zero payment for allocating the worst alternative. In other words, individual rationality "binds" for the worst alternative. We show that this result continues to remain valid in arbitrary non-quasilinear type spaces.
We apply our results to provide a template for identifying an optimal contract in a principal-agent model. An important insight from the mechanism design literature with quasilinearity is that the optimization problem for finding an optimal contract can be reduced to an optimization problem over the set of monotone allocation rules. The objective function can be rewritten in terms of the allocation rule using the revenue equivalence formula. Furthermore, the incentive and individual rationality constraints can be replaced by a monotonicity constraint on the allocation rule. This approach is key to solving tractable optimal contract problems (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Myerson, 1981) . We show that this approach can be extended to our model with non-quasilinear preferences. We now proceed to the details.
The Model
Let A be a finite set of alternatives with |A| ≥ 2. We will endow A with a strict partial order . This partial oder reflects a possible ex ante ordering of alternatives if there was no monetary compensation. The partial order may be empty -for instance, if A is the set of public goods and there is no ex ante distinction among the public goods. In the problem of selling multiple units of a homogeneous good, a standard assumption is that more units are preferred to less. If there are two alternatives a and b with a being "k units of the good" and b being " units of the good", we may impose a b if and only if k > . In combinatorial auctions for selling multiple objects, may be the partial order induced by the set inclusion relation over subsets of objects.
There is a single agent in our model. Our main results extend to a model with multiple agents in a straightforward manner as our solution concept is dominant strategy equilibrium.
We allow for monetary transfers or payments. Hence, a consumption bundle for the agent is a pair (a, p), where a ∈ A is an alternative and p ∈ R is the payment of the agent. The set of all such consumption bundles is denoted by Z := {(a, p) : a ∈ A, p ∈ R}.
The agent has a complete and transitive preference over Z. A typical preference will be denoted by R with its strict and indifferent components denoted by P and I respectively.
We call a preference R over Z classical if it satisfies the following conditions:
• money monotonicity. (a, p ) P (a, p) ∀ a ∈ A, ∀ p, p ∈ R with p > p .
• respect. (a, p) P (b, p) ∀ p ∈ R, ∀ a, b ∈ A with a b.
• continuity. for all z ∈ Z, the sets {z ∈ Z : z R z } and {z ∈ Z : z R z} are closed.
• possibility of compensation. for every z ∈ Z and for every a ∈ A, there exists p and p such that (a, p) R z and z R (a, p ).
While monotonicity and continuity are natural restrictions, we impose the possibility of compensation condition for technical reasons. We will only be concerned with classical preferences in the paper, and whenever we write "preference", we will mean a "classical preference".
Indifference vectors
It is convenient to think of a preference in terms of its indifference vectors. A vector v ∈ R |A| is an indifference vector of preference R if for all a, b ∈ A, we have (a, v a ) I (b, v b ). Denote the set of all indifference vectors of R by I(R). For every preference, its indifference vectors satisfy many natural properties. In order to discuss them, we introduce the notion of a valuation.
The valuation of the agent with preference R for alternative a at consumption bundle z is denoted by V R (a, z), where (a, V R (a, z)) I z. In other words, V R (a, z) is the unique payment that makes the agent indifferent between consumption bundle z and (a, V R (a, z)). The existence of V R (a, z) and its uniqueness is guaranteed by the assumptions on preferences. As a result, for every preference R and for every pair of distinct indifference vectors v, v ∈ I(R),
we have either v > v or v > v, i.e., v and v do not intersect. A typical indifference vector v of a preference R can be represented by a diagram shown in Figure 1 . We will use such figures throughout our paper, and we will refer to them as 1 Whenever, we write v > v we mean v x > v x for all x ∈ A. indifference diagrams.
2 Figure 1 shows how a indifference diagram can be constructed for four alternatives. Each horizontal line in the indifference diagram corresponds to a unique alternative. Every point on a horizontal line corresponds to a payment level. So, the set of all consumption bundles Z are the four horizontal lines in this indifference diagram. As we move rightwards along a horizontal line, the payment of the agent increases. Hence, consumption bundles to the right (left) of the indifference vector v in Figure 1 are worse (respectively, better) than the four consumption bundles corresponding to v.
An equivalent way to think of a preference R is through its infinite set of indifference vectors I(R). Hence, the indifference diagram of a preference consists of an infinite collection of such vectors -a representative indifference diagram is shown in Figure 2 . 
Positive income effect
Two special kinds of preferences are worth highlighting. A pair of vectors
2 William Thomson popularised such diagrams to represent preferences in private good models with indivisible goods and money.
Definition 1 A preference R is quasilinear if every pair of indifference vectors v, v ∈ I(R) are parallel. A preference R satisfies positive income effect (PIE) if every pair of indifference vectors v, v ∈ I(R) satisfy DD.
We denote the set of all quasilinear preferences and the set of all preferences satisfying PIE by Q and R + respectively. 3 Note that Q ∩ R + = ∅. For any R ∈ R + , the indifference diagram corresponding to R is shown in Figure 3 . To understand PIE, take any R ∈ R + and v ∈ I(R). Consider another vectorv defined byv x = v x − δ ∀ x ∈ A, where δ > 0. Suppose that for some a ∈ A, we have v a > v x for all x = a (as in Figure 3 ). Then, we see that for any x = a, the consumption bundle (a,v a )
is strictly preferred to (x,v x ) according to R. As we decrease the payment by a constant amount δ from v tov (i.e., increase the wealth level by δ), the highest payment consumption bundle at v is the most preferred now. This is the idea of a positive income effect, which is usually observed in normal goods. Contrast this with a quasilinear preference, where the agent will be indifferent between all the bundles onv.
The decreasing differences property imposes restrictions on admissible indifference vectors. To further highlight these restrictions, consider A = {a, b} and is empty. The
3 To be precise, Q is the set of all preferences that respect and are quasilinear. For notational simplicity, we suppress the dependence of Q on . Further, we refer to Q as the quasilinear domain, meaning the quasilinear domain corresponding to a given . A similar comment applies to R + and other domains discussed henceforth. indifference diagram for a preference R for this example is shown in Figure 4 . We argue that R does not satisfy PIE. This is because the indifference vectors v, v ∈ I(R) satisfy v > v
. This is the intuition for Fact 1 below.
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Fact 1 (Remark 2 in Zhou and Serizawa (2018) ) Suppose R is a preference satisfying PIE. Then, there exists a weak ordering on the set of alternatives such that for every a, b ∈ A and every v ∈ I(R),
Fact 1 implies that even if is empty, there is an underlying weak order for every positive income effect preference. Notice that, potentially, such a weak order may be different for different positive income effect preferences. To understand the interaction between and , fix an R that satisfies PIE. Then, (a) is weak but complete (but may be empty); (b) must match whenever the latter is non-empty, i.e., for any a, b ∈ A, a b implies a b holds but b a does not hold. Hence, if is a complete order, = .
We will also be concerned with the following weaker notion of decreasing differences. A pair of vectors v, v ∈ R |A| with v > v satisfies decreasing differences ( DD) if for all a, b ∈ A, we have Figure 4 satisfies PIE vacuously since is empty (though it does not satisfy PIE).
Domains, mechanisms and questions
Let R be the set of all (classical) preferences. A type space or domain D is any subset of R.
A mechanism on a domain D is a pair of maps (f, p), where f : D → A is an allocation rule and p : D → R is a payment rule. Throughout the paper, we will only consider allocation rules that are onto: for every a ∈ A, there exists some preference R ∈ D such that f (R) = a. 5 We will investigate the implications of two desiderata for our mechanisms.
Besides incentive compatibility, we will consider individual rationality. Whenever we talk about individual rationality, we will assume the existence of an alternative a 0 ∈ A such that a a 0 for all a = a 0 . Alternative a 0 can be interpreted as the outside option, for instance not getting any object in a multiple object auction model or not providing any public good in a public good model. We will not require the existence of such an alternative for our results involving only DSIC.
We will answer three questions in our model of preferences.
• In quasilinear domain, a monotonicity condition of allocation rule and a revenue equivalence formula characterize a DSIC mechanism. What is the analogue of such a characterization without quasilinearity?
• What happens to revenue equivalence without quasilinearity?
• Does the IR constraint bind for the worst alternative without quasilinearity?
5 In some sense, ontoness is without loss of generality. If we have an allocation rule f whose range is A A, then we can consider the entire model where A is replaced by A .
Richness
Our results will require our domains to be suitably rich. The weakest richness condition that we require is the following.
Definition 4 A domain of preferences D satisfies one-point (OP) richness if for every v ∈ R |A| that respects , there exists R ∈ D such that v ∈ I(R).
OP richness is satisfied by Q -the set of all quasilinear preferences. It is therefore satisfied by any domain D ⊇ Q. It is also satisfied by R + -the set of all positive income effect preferences (and supersets of that). OP richness allows us to construct a preference that has one specific indifference vector. It is silent on the other indifference vectors in the preference.
The quasilinear domain Q satisfies OP richness. By definition, Q contains all quasilinear preferences respecting . OP richness will be violated if we take a strict subset of Q.
For example, suppose A = {a 0 , a 1 , a 2 } with a 2 a 1 a 0 . A quasilinear preference is represented by a valuation vector v ∈ R 3 + with v a 2 > v a 1 > v a 0 = 0. The quasilinear domain Q contains preferences corresponding to all such vectors in R 3 + . Now, consider a specific kind of quasilinear preference whose valuation vector is v a 2 = 2θ, v a 1 = θ, v a 0 = 0 for some θ ∈ R ++ . The set of all such preferences is:
It is clear that Q 1 is a strict subset of Q and it contains very specific "one-dimensional" quasilinear preferences. The domain Q 1 fails OP richness. Though our richness conditions will exclude domains like Q 1 , they still admit interesting domains where a large class of DSIC mechanisms exist. For instance, the family of Groves mechanisms are DSIC in Q.
Our next notion of richness requires the existence of a preference for some specific pair of indifference vectors.
Our next richness condition gives us the flexibility to construct some preference using every pair of ∆ + parallel vectors. We now introduce our final notion of richness.
Notice that ∆ parallel requires a pair of vectors to satisfy DD but ∆ + parallel requires them to satisfy DD. If v,v satisfy decreasing differences, the first condition in Definition 7 is automatically satisfied. Hence, any pair of vectors v,v that are ∆ + parallel are also ∆ We now give more examples of domains that satisfy our richness. Pick any a * ∈ A. For every pair of preferences R, R , define the distance between R and R as
Pick any ∆ > 0. Define Q ∆ and Q ∆ + as follows:
Intuitively, Q ∆ and Q ∆ + are domains of preferences that are "∆-close" to the domain of quasilinear preferences (and satisfy PIE and PIE respectively). Since Q
We show below that any domain that contains
The proof of Lemma 1 is in Appendix B. An important consequence of this lemma is that even though Q fails our richness requirements, there are domains arbitrarily close to Q that satisfy our richness. Further, such domains need not contain Q. The following corollary provides a statement of domains satisfying various notions of richness.
Corollary 1 Suppose ∆ > 0. Then, the following are true.
Our results will require one of the three notions of richness. Corollary 1 shows the applicability of our results to specific economic domains of interest.
We emphasize here that TP 
Example 2
We fix some ∆ > 0 and explicitly construct a subset of preferences in Q ∆ + for A = {0, 1} with 1 0. Let H denote the set of all decreasing and continuous functions from R to (−1, 1). For every θ ∈ R ++ and for every h ∈ H, define a preference R(θ, h) by defining
Readers can verify that for every θ ∈ R ++ and every h ∈ H, we have R(θ, h) ∈ Q ∆ + .
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So, Q ∆ + contains preferences that cannot be parameterized by a finite number of parameters. Thus, it contains a greater variety of preferences than the domain in Example 1.
Monotonicity and incentive compatibility
Incentive compatibility is usually equivalent to some form of monotonicity in various models of mechanism design. Though the precise nature of monotonicity may differ from model to model, its usefulness is beyond doubt. For instance, in optimal single object auction design, Myerson (1981) uses it to simplify the optimization problem of revenue maximization -we will elaborate further on such an application in Section 7.
We begin with an informal description of the notion of monotonicity relevant for our model. Let (f, p) be a DSIC mechanism on a domain D. Consider two preferences R,R ∈ D.
Let f (R) = a and f (R) = b. Consider the two indifference vectors corresponding to R andR, and passing through z ≡ (b, p(R)), i.e., the consumption bundle assigned to the agent with preferenceR. Figure 6 shows the indifference diagram for this situation. DSIC implies that zR (a, p(R)). Hence, p(R) ≥ VR(a, z) as shown in Figure 6 . Similarly, DSIC Figure 6 . This implies that
We chose the consumption bundle z at preferenceR and alternative a at R. Monotonicity requires that the valuation for a at z must weakly increase fromR to R. This is a necessary condition for DSIC.
7 Fix θ ∈ R ++ and h ∈ H. For every p, since h(p) ∈ (−1, 1), we have V R(θ,h) (1, (0, p)) > p. Since h is decreasing, the indifference vectors in R(θ, h) satisfy DD. So, R(θ, h) respects and satisfies PIE. Finally, for every R(θ, h), if we consider the quasilinear preference R 0 defined by
interpreted as the valuation of the agent, we note that Figure 6 : Illustration of necessity of monotonicity for DSIC.
We will discuss the precise connections between our notion of monotonicity and the monotonicity condition used in the quasilinear domain in the literature in Section 8. Besides monotonicity, we will use the following condition on payments.
The posted-price property is a trivial consequence of DSIC. It says that if two preferences are assigned the same alternative, they cannot be assigned different payments. It is obvious that DSIC implies the posted-price property. We are now ready to state our first main result.
Then, the following statements are equivalent.
2. (f, p) is monotone and satisfies the posted-price property.
The necessity of the posted-price property and monotonicity has been already argued. The proof of the other direction (2) ⇒ (1) is rather involved and provided in Appendix A. We present a sketch of the proof for the case of two alternatives.
Consider the two alternatives case: A = {a, b}. Suppose a b (if is empty, the proof is simpler). Fix some ∆ > 0 and a domain D that satisfies TP ∆ richness. Let (f, p) be a mechanism on this domain satisfying monotonicity and the posted-price property.
Hence, there are two numbers κ(a) and κ(b) such that for every R ∈ D, we have p(R) = κ(f (R)). Assume for contradiction that there is a preference R ∈ D such that f (R) = a and (b, κ(b)) P (a, κ(a)). Then, it must be that V R (a, (b, κ(b))) < κ(a). Define the following:
By ontoness, there is some R with f (R ) = b. By monotonicity, we have
, where the strict inequality follows from the fact that a b and R respects . Since V R (a, (b, κ(b))) < κ(a), we have η < κ(a). We conclude that η is a real number satisfying
We construct two pairs of vectors (u, u ) and (v, v ) as follows. 
Illustration of proof of Theorem 1 for two alternatives with a b.
(u, u ) are ∆ parallel, and (v, v ) are ∆ parallel. This uses the fact that for all values of ∆ > 0 is, we can always find δ > 0 but sufficiently small such that these pairs of vectors are ∆ parallel. Using TP ∆ richness, we construct two preferences R and R such that u, u ∈ I( R) and v, v ∈ I( R). By definition of η, there exists a preference R * such that
Similarly, by the definition of η, we see that f ( R) = b. But, by the definition of u and v , we have
contradicts monotonicity. A similar argument shows that no manipulation is possible from a preference where b is chosen. The general proof uses similar ideas but it is more involved because A can have more than two alternatives and need not be a complete order.
We make two remarks about Theorem 1 before stating our next result.
Remark 1. Theorem 1 is the analogue of monotonicity based characterization found in the literature on quasilinear domain. However, there are significant differences as we explain in Section 8. Informally, such a characterization for the quasilinear domain requires monotonicity of the allocation rule and a revenue equivalence formula (which is significantly stronger than the posted-price property). Theorem 1 shows that under TP ∆ richness, monotonicity of the mechanism and the posted-price property are equivalent to DSIC. Of course, monotonicity of the mechanism is different from the monotonicity of the allocation rule alone (though they coincide in the quasilinear domain -see Section 8 for details).
Remark 2. As discussed earlier, TP ∆ richness is a stronger richness requirement than TP ∆ + richness. We give a simple example to show that Theorem 1 may not hold with TP ∆ + richness -of course, if is a complete order, then the two richness notions are equivalent.
Example 3
Suppose A = {a, b} and is empty. Suppose D = R + , i.e., the domain is the set of all positive income effect preferences. Fix two numbers κ(a) and κ(b) with κ(a) > κ(b). Define a subset of PIE preferences as follows:
By definition, (f, p) satisfies the posted-price property. To verify monotonicity, pick R such that f (R) = a and R such that f (R ) = b. The indifference vectors of preference R are shown in the indifference diagram in Figure 8 .
. This shows that one of the monotonicity con-
For the other monotonicity condition,
we use the fact that R, R satisfy PIE.
(since R satisfies PIE). Combining these two, we get the other monotonicity condition:
However, this mechanism is not DSIC. Since
As shown in Figure 8 , since (f (R), p(R)) = (a, κ(a)), we see that R is better off manipulating to a preference in D * to get the consumption bundle
Note that if is empty, R + = R (the entire set of preferences). Consider the earlier mechanism (f, p) in Example 3 on D = R. The earlier argument again shows that f is not DSIC. We know that Theorem 1 holds in R. Hence, f must violate monotonicity. To see this, consider R and R as shown in Figure 9 . Note that R violates PIE and Figure 9 : Illustration of violation of monotonicity of f when is empty.
A revenue uniqueness theorem
One of the fundamental results in mechanism design with quasilinearity is the Revenue Equivalence. It helps us to understand why seemingly different auction formats generate the same expected revenue. From a methodological point of view, revenue equivalence allows significant simplification of the optimization problem for maximizing revenue.
Definition 11 A domain D satisfies revenue equivalence if for every pair of DSIC mechanism (f, p) and (f,p) on D, we have
In other words, if we two mechanisms differ from each other only in their payment rules, then the payment rules must be translations of each other. It is well known that Q is a revenue equivalence domain.
What happens to revenue equivalence without quasilinearity? Consider an example with four alternatives. Let (f, p) and (f,p) be two DSIC mechanisms such thatp is a translation of p. By the posted-price property, we have two maps κ : A → R andκ : A → R corresponding to these two mechanisms. Assume that κ,κ are translations of each other. The indifference diagram is shown in Figure 10 . As shown in Figure 10 , we can construct two vectors v and v such that v is to the left of κ andv is to the right ofκ. If we can ensure that there exists a preference R such that v,v ∈ I(R), then we get a contradiction from DSIC as follows: DSIC of (f, p) implies that f (R) = a (since (a, κ(a)) P (x, κ(x)) for all x = a) but DSIC of (f,p)
implies that f (R) = a (since (x,κ(x)) P (a,κ(a)) for all x = a). We show that the existence of such a preference R is guaranteed by TP Hence, there exist maps κ and κ such that κ(f (R)) = p(R) and κ (f (R)) = p (R) for all R ∈ D. Since p = p , we get κ = κ . We now complete the proof in three steps.
Step 1. In this step, we show that κ and κ respect .
8 Pick any a, b ∈ A and suppose b a. Pick R such that f (R) = a (by ontoness, this is possible). By incentive compatibility,
Combining the two inequalities, we get κ(b) > κ(a) as desired. A similar proof works for κ .
Step 2. In this step, we show that either κ > κ or κ > κ. Without loss of generality, assume that κ(a) > κ (a) for some a ∈ A. 
Then, DSIC of (f, p ) implies f (R) = b. This is a contradiction. Hence, κ(b) > κ (b) for all b ∈ A.
Step 3. We now complete the proof. Since κ and κ respect and κ > κ , Lemma 4 (whose statement and proof are in Appendix B.2) implies the existence of vectors v, v ∈ R |A| which respect and are ∆ + parallel. Further, by Lemma 4, there exists a * ∈ A such that
for all x = a * . Since (f, p) is DSIC, we must have f (R) = a * . This is a contradiction.
Theorem 2 provides an analogue to a fundamental result in the quasilinear domain. Once an allocation rule is fixed, in a domain satisfying TP ∆ + richness, DSIC leaves little flexibility in the construction of a payment rule.
Does individual rationality bind?
A well-known result in the screening problem with quasilinearity is that the individual rationality constraint binds for "low types" in the expected revenue maximizing contract for the principal (Mussa and Rosen, 1978) . This result leads to a major simplification on obtaining a solution to the optimal contract. In this section, we explore the validity of this result on non-quasilinear domains.
We will assume that a 0 ∈ A is the worst alternative according to and the IR constraint is defined with (a 0 , 0) being the outside consumption bundle (Definition 3). We state a straightforward lemma on IR below.
Lemma 2 Suppose (f, p) is a DSIC mechanism. Then, it is IR if and only if p(R) ≤ 0 for all R with f (R) = a 0 .
Proof : If (f, p) is IR, then (a 0 , p(R)) R (a 0 , 0) for all R with f (R) = a 0 , and this implies that p(R) ≤ 0. For the converse, pick any R with f (R) = a. There exists a R with f (R ) = a 0 .
By DSIC, (a, p(R)) R (a 0 , p(R )) R (a 0 , 0), where the last relation comes from the fact that
Lemma 2 assumes that the range of f includes a 0 . If the range of f does not include a 0 , our assumption implies the agent pays zero whenever she exercises her outside option (a 0 , 0).
The point of this section is to show that if a 0 is in the range of a DSIC and IR mechanism, we can construct another DSIC and IR mechanism such that IR binds in the following sense.
Definition 13 IR binds in a domain D if for every DSIC and IR mechanism (f, p) on D, there exists a DSIC and IR mechanism (f ,p) on D such that
If IR binds, we can convert any DSIC and IR mechanism to another DSIC and IR mechanism such that payment for a 0 is zero and revenue does not fall.
The IR constraint binds in Q. This can be seen as follows. Pick (f, p) which is DSIC and IR. By Lemma 2, we see that p(R) ≤ 0 for all R with f (R) = a 0 . By the posted-price
Sincep is a translation of p and the domain is the quasilinear domain, we see that (f,p) is DSIC and IR. Since κ(a 0 ) ≤ 0, we havep(R) ≥ p(R) for all R. Hence, IR binds in Q. A crucial aspect of this simple argument is that we only change p top while constructing the new mechanism. The allocation rule f was unchanged. Such an argument does not work if the domain is not Q. Even then, we can establish that IR binds in any domain of preferences.
Theorem 3 IR binds in every domain of preferences.
Proof : Suppose D is a domain of preferences. Let (f, p) be a DSIC and IR mechanism defined on D. By the posted-price property, there exists κ :
for all R ∈ D. By Lemma 2, we know that κ(a 0 ) ≤ 0. Let A \ {a 0 } = {a 1 , . . . , a K } and without loss of generality, assume that κ(a 1 ) ≤ . . . ≤ κ(a K ). We now define another map κ : A → R as follows:κ(a 0 ) := 0 and
Having definedκ(a 1 ), . . . ,κ(a k ), we definẽ κ(a k+1 ) := min
The mechanism (f ,p) is defined as follows. For every R, the agent chooses her best consumption bundle according to R from the set {(a 0 ,κ(a 0 )), . . . , (a K ,κ(a K ))}, with ties broken in favor of the higher indexed alternative. More formally, for every R, define
Then,f (R) := a if a ∈ M (R) and > j for all a j ∈ M (R) \ {a }. Further,p(R) :=κ(a ).
Trivially, (f ,p) is DSIC. Sinceκ(a 0 ) = 0, by Lemma 2, (f ,p) is IR. We now complete the proof by showingp(R) ≥ p(R) for all R.
Step 1. In this step, we show thatκ(a j ) ≥ κ(a j ) for all a j ∈ A. Since (f, p) is IR, we know that κ(a 0 ) ≤ 0. By definition, 0 =κ(a 0 ) ≥ κ(a 0 ). Now, we prove the step using induction on the indices: supposeκ(a j ) ≥ κ(a j ) for all a j ∈ {a 0 , . . . , a k }. Then, we observe that κ(a k+1 ) = min
where the last inequality follows from the fact that for every R with f (R) = a k+1 , DSIC
Step 2. We now complete the proof. Pick any R ∈ D. Let f (R) = a k . By definition, κ(a k ) ≤ V R (a k , (a j ,κ(a j ))) for all j < k. Hence, (a k ,κ(a k )) R (a j ,κ(a j )) for all j < k. But then by the tie-breaking rule,f (R) = a j for all j < k. So,f (R) = a for some ≥ k. Hence, we get
where the first inequality follows from the fact that ≥ k and the second inequality follows from Step 1.
Remark 3. The allocations rules f andf in the proof of Theorem 3 can be quite different on an arbitrary domain. They will be identical if the domain is Q. However, we can establish a relationship between f andf . As in the proof of Theorem 3, let A\{a 0 } = {a 1 , . . . , a K }, and without loss of generality, assume that κ(a 1 ) ≤ . . . ≤ κ(a K ). We can show that for any R,
The claim is obvious if j = 0. So, assume that j > 0. Now, pick a , where < j. By the definition ofκ(a j ), we haveκ(a j ) ≤ V R (a j , (a ,κ(a ))).
Hence, (a j ,κ(a j )) R (a ,κ(a )). Further, < j and the tie-breaking rule forf implies f (R) = a . In particular, when is complete with a K a K−1 . . . a 1 a 0 , we will have κ(a 1 ) < . . . < κ(a K ). This will imply thatf (R) is assigned an alternative a k such that
, where f (R) = a j . Thus,f assigns "higher valued" alternatives (i.e., higher in the rank of ) at each preference to increase payments.
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Theorem 3 implies that IR binds in Q and all the other domains discussed in Corollary 1. This has implications in solving optimization problems with incentive and individual rationality constraints as we discuss in the next section.
A template for optimal contract design
In this section, we demonstrate the usefulness of the results in the previous section in finding solution to the optimal contract problem in non-quasilinear environments. We assume the existence of a 0 such that a a 0 for all a ∈ A and IR constraint will be defined with (a 0 , 0) as the outside option. We fix a domain D. Let µ be a probability measure on D.
A mechanism (f * , p * ) is optimal if it is a solution to the following program (in all the optimization programs below, we assume that a maximum exists).
subject to (f, p) is DSIC and IR
Using our results, we show that the optimization program aboved can be simplified. To do so, we define the notion of a canonical mechanism. For every allocation rule f : D → A, define its canonical payment rule p f : D → R as follows:
A mechanism (f, p) is a canonical mechanism if p = p f . A canonical mechanism is uniquely defined by the allocation rule only. A canonical mechanism is not necessarily DSIC. However, if it is DSIC, then it is IR too -since the payment is zero when a 0 is allocated. We show below that an optimal mechanism is a canonical mechanism.
Theorem 4 Suppose D satisfies OP richness. Then, an optimal mechanism on D is a canonical mechanism.
Proof : The proof uses the following lemma characterizing DSIC mechanisms in domains satisfying OP richness.
Lemma 3 Suppose D satisfies OP richness and (f, p) is a mechanism defined on D. Then, (f, p) is DSIC if and only if, for every R, R ∈ D, we have
Proof : Suppose (f, p) satisfies the condition in the statement of the lemma. Then, pick any R, R and we get,
Hence, (f (R), p(R)) R (f (R ), p(R )), which implies that (f, p) is DSIC. Now, suppose (f, p) is DSIC. Then, DSIC implies there exists a map κ : A → R such that κ respects and κ(f (R)) = p(R) for all R -from the necessity of the posted-price property and
Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 2. Then, pick any a, b ∈ A. Choose > 0 but arbitrarily close to zero and consider the following vector v ∈ R |A| :
Since κ respects and is sufficiently close to zero, v respects . By OP richness, there is a preferenceR such that v ∈ I(R). Since v a > κ(a) and v x = κ(x) for all x = a, DSIC implies that f (R) = a. Hence, we have VR(a, (b, κ(b))) = κ(a) + . Taking → 0, we get
We can now complete the proof of the theorem. By Theorem 3, IR binds. Hence, every optimal mechanism (f, p) must have p(R) = 0 if f (R) = a 0 . Then, by Lemma 3, OP richness guarantees that for every R with f (R) = a = a 0 , we have p(R) = inf R :f (R )=a V R (a, (a 0 , 0) ).
Hence, p = p f , and every optimal mechanism is a canonical mechanism.
Remark 4. Theorem 4 assumes that a 0 will lie in the range of the optimal mechanism. This is without loss of generality for any probability measure that assigns zero probability to a set containing one preference. To see this, suppose (f, p) is an optimal mechanism such that a 0 is not in the range of f . Suppose the range of f is A := A\{a 0 }. By the posted-price property, there is a map κ : A → R such that for all R with f (R) = a, we have p(R) = κ(f (R)). Then, consider the vector v where v a 0 = 0 and v a = κ(a) for all a ∈ A . By OP-richness, there is a preference R such that v ∈ I(R). By definition, (f (R), p(R)) I (a 0 , 0). Consider a new mechanism (f , p ) such that f (R) = a 0 and p (R) = 0 and
for all R = R. Since (f, p) is DSIC and IR, the new mechanism (f , p ) is also DSIC. By
Lemma 2, the new mechanism (f , p ) satisfies IR. Further, the two mechanisms differ at only one preference. By our assumption on the probability measure, the expected revenue from both mechanisms is the same.
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Theorem 4 and Theorem 1 have an immediate corollary that allows us to reduce the search space of our optimal mechanism. First, Theorem 4 shows that we need to search only over canonical mechanisms. Second, Theorem 1 says that if the domain satisfies TP ∆ richness for some ∆ > 0, we need to search only over canonical mechanisms that satisfy monotonicity.
By construction, every DSIC canonical mechanism is IR, and hence, we can get rid of the IR constraint. Further, every canonical mechanism satisfies the posted-price property. Therefore, DSIC can just be replaced by the monotonicity condition of the canonical mechanism.
Since a canonical mechanism is uniquely defined by the corresponding allocation rule, the search space of the optimal mechanism problem becomes the space of all allocation rules such that the canonical mechanism is monotone. This leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Let ∆ > 0. Suppose D satisfies TP ∆ richness. Then, every optimal mecha-nism is a solution to the following program.
This result parallels a similar result in the quasilinear domain. As argued earlier, Theorem 4 holds in the quasilinear domain. We say an allocation rule f is implementable if there exists a payment rule p such that (f, p) is DSIC. It is difficult to verify implementability of an allocation rule without quasilinearity (because of the non-separable nature of allocation and payment in the utility function of the agent). However, if the domain is Q, an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it is weakly monotone (Bikhchandani et al., 2006 ). An allocation rule f (defined on the quasilinear domain) is weakly monotone if for every quasilinear preferences R and R with f (R) = a and f (R ) = b such that valuation vectors v and v represent R and R respectively, we have
As we show later, in the quasilinear domain, a mechanism (f, p) is monotone if and only if f is weakly monotone. We also know that if f is implementable on Q, then by revenue equivalence, we can construct p f such that (f, p f ) is DSIC and IR (Heydenreich et al., 2009) . Hence, the analogue of the program in Corollary 2 is well-known to be the following program on Q:
subject to f is weakly monotone Such a simplification is useful for computing an optimal contract. For instance, in the single object allocation problem, it is standard to solve the unconstrained optimization problem and then verify that the unconstrained optimum satisfies weak monotonicity.
Our program in Corollary 2 has similar features: the search space of optimal mechanism is only over allocation rules such that the corresponding canonical mechanism is monotone.
Thus, we provide a template for designing optimal mechanisms without quasilinearity. Such a template is useful if the underlying optimization problem is tractable. This will depend on the specific domain considered. We now briefly outline how it can be applied to a model with two alternatives.
Suppose A = {a 0 , a 1 } with a 1 a 0 . In a model, where a single object needs to be allocated, a 0 can be thought of as the alternative where the object is not allocated and a 1 is the alternative where the object is allocated. To find a revenue-maximizing mechanism in such a model, Theorem 4 says that we need to focus on canonical mechanisms corresponding to monotone allocation rules. Given an allocation rule f , the canonical mechanism in this model has a payment rule characterized by (a 0 , 0) ).
Since a 1 a 0 , we will have V R (a 1 , (a 0 , 0)) > 0 for all R, and hence, κ f (a 1 ) ≥ 0. A canonical mechanism (f, κ f ) only requires that an agent with preference R submits her valuation
Monotonicity of (f, κ f ) requires that for any R with f (R) = a 0 and R with f (R ) = a 1 , we must have
These conditions are equivalent to requiring that
. So, every canonical mechanism can be constructed by a cutoff κ * such that for all R, if V R (a 1 , (a 0 , 0)) > κ * , we have f (R) = a 1 , and if
we can assign either a 1 or a 0 in the allocation rule). Further, if f (R) = a 1 for any R, then p(R) = κ * . Otherwise,
The revenue from such a canonical mechanism is κ * (1−G(κ * )), where G is the cumulative probability distribution of valuation for a 1 at (a 0 , 0) (i.e., distribution of V R (a 1 , (a 0 , 0))).
Hence, finding an optimal mechanism is choosing an optimal value of κ * to maximize κ
It is well-known that this expression is maximized under monotone hazard rate condition at a value of κ * that satisfies κ
, where g is the probability density function associated with G.
Relationship with the quasilinear domain results
In this section, we formally compare our results to analogous results in the quasilinear do- Monotonicity in the quasilinear domain. Our monotonicity condition reduces to the following condition in quasilinear domains. Take two valuation vectors v, v ∈ R |A| and denote the underlying quasilinear preferences corresponding to them by R, R respectively.
Consider a mechanism (f, p) and let f (R) = a and f (R ) = b. Note that
Hence, our monotonicity condition
. This is the familiar weak monotonicity or 2-cycle monotonicity condition from the quasilinear domain literature (Bikhchandani et al., 2006; Saks and Yu, 2005; Ashlagi et al., 2010) . Hence, in the quasilinear domain, monotonicity of the mechanism reduces to weak monotonicity of the allocation rule f .
Mechanism characterization. The monotonicity condition is too weak in the quasilinear domain, and hence, the posted-price property needs to be significantly strengthened to a revenue equivalence formula to imply incentive compatibility of a mechanism. We consider a result for the quasilinear domain to compare it with our Theorem 1. The result is due to Jehiel et al. (1999) , but we report a version of this result given in Ashlagi et al. (2010) . In order to state this result conveniently, we slightly abuse notation to write a mechanism (f, p) on a quasilinear type space with domain of valuations V ⊆ R |A| as maps: f : V → A and
Fact 2 (Proposition 1 in Jehiel et al. (1999) ) Suppose (f, p) is a mechanism defined on a convex domain of valuations V ⊆ R |A| . Then, (1) and (2) below are equivalent.
2. f is weakly monotone and for every v, v ∈ V, we have
Here, I a is an indicator vector in R |A| , where the component corresponding to a is set to 1 and all other components are zero.
Fact 2 generalizes analogous results for two alternatives case in Myerson (1981) , where he develops this result in the single object auction framework. Statement 2(b) implies that if we have two incentive compatible mechanisms with the same allocation rule, (f, p) and (f, p ), then p(v) = p (v) for some v implies that p = p . This is usually referred to as the revenue equivalence formula or the envelope formula (Milgrom and Segal, 2002; Krishna and Maenner, 2001) . Contrast this to our Theorem 2, which states that in domains satisfying TP ∆ + richness (for any ∆ > 0), we have revenue uniqueness. We can contrast our Theorem 1 with Fact 2. Theorem 1 characterizes incentive compatibility by monotonicity of the mechanism and the posted-price property. On the other hand, Fact 2 characterizes incentive compatibility using weak monotonicity of allocation rule and the revenue equivalence formula. The richness of our non-quasilinear type space allows us to use the monotonicity of the mechanism along with a simple condition on payments in Theorem 1 to characterize incentive compatibility.
Allocation rule characterization. In the quasilinear domain, due to the separability (and linearity) of the payment from the allocation rule, one can focus attention on the implementability question -if we know that f is implementable, then due to Fact 2, there is an explicit way to compute payments using f (up to an additive constant). The following fact answers the question: when is an allocation rule f implementable (i.e., there exists a p
Fact 3 (Saks and Yu (2005); Ashlagi et al. (2010) ) Suppose closure of V ⊆ R |A| is convex and f is an allocation rule defined on V. Then, f is implementable if and only if it is weakly monotone.
Fact 3 was first shown for the quasilinear domain (i.e., V consists of all valuation vectors in R |A| respecting ) in Bikhchandani et al. (2006) . Though Theorem 1 seems like an extension of their result to non-quasilinear domains, it should not be confused as an analogue of Fact 3. There are two important differences: (1) Theorem 1 is a characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms using monotonicity of the mechanism and Fact 3 is a characterization of implementable allocation rules in the quasilinear domain using monotonicity of the allocation rule; (2) Theorem 1 uses richness of the non-quasilinear domain and it does not apply to the quasilinear domain.
Related literature
The literature on mechanism design with quasilinearity is extensive, and almost impossible to describe exhaustively. We have discussed some relevant papers in detail in Section 8, but refer the reader to two excellent books on this topic (Vohra, 2011; Borgers et al., 2015) . Following Myerson (1981) , several papers have extended his monotonicity and revenue equivalence characterizations to various models with multidimensional types, where more than two alternatives are allocated and agents have values for each of those alternatives. Because of quasilinearity, the allocation rule and the payment rule of a mechanism appear in separable form in the utility function of the agent. This allows one to provide separate characterizations of implementable allocation rules and the class of payment rules that implement an implementable allocation rule. The former is characterized by (weak) monotonicity (Bikhchandani et al., 2006; Saks and Yu, 2005; Ashlagi et al., 2010; Cuff et al., 2012; Mishra and Roy, 2013; Mishra et al., 2014; Carbajal and Müller, 2015) . 11 The latter is characterized by a revenue equivalence formula (Krishna and Maenner, 2001; Milgrom and Segal, 2002; Chung and Olszewski, 2007; Heydenreich et al., 2009 ). These results exploit the geometric structure induced by quasilinearity, and make use of convex analysis machinery (Rockafellar, 1970) . A paper by Carbajal and Ely (2013) establishes that revenue equivalence may not hold in some problems even with quasilinearity -this is due to the non-convex and non-differentiable nature of valuation function. They further show that in specific problems where revenue equivalence fails, one can still do revenue maximization using revenue inequalities.
In the absence of quasilinearity, it is not possible to provide separate characterizations of monotonicity and revenue equivalence since the allocation and payment are no longer separable. Our monotonicity condition is indeed a condition on the mechanism, but reduces to the weak monotonicity condition on the allocation rule in the quasilinear domain. Unlike the quasilinear domain, we find revenue uniqueness of incentive compatible mechanisms in our benchmark rich type space.
There is a small but relevant literature on mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences. The closest paper to ours is Kos and Messner (2013) . They derive a necessary condition for incentive compatibility in a model with non-quasilinearity. Their condition is a generalization of the cycle monotonicity condition in Rochet (1987) for quasilinear preferences. They show that their condition is not sufficient for incentive compatibility. In contrast, our monotonicity condition is significantly weaker than their condition and is a necessary and sufficient condition for incentive compatibility along with the posted-price
property. However, we focus on deterministic mechanisms assuming some form of richness in type space, while Kos and Messner (2013) do not make such assumptions.
Baisa (2017) considers the single object auction model with non-quasilinear preferences but allows for randomization. He introduces a novel mechanism in his setting and studies its optimality properties (in terms of revenue maximization). Garratt and Pycia (2016) study the bilateral trading model with non-quasilinear preferences, where they allow for randomization. Further, their solution concept is Bayesian incentive compatibility. Their main finding is that for generic set of non-quasilinear preferences, the Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility result (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983) on bilateral trading disappears. Unlike both these papers, we do not consider randomization and our solution concept is different from theirs.
More importantly, we have a more general model of non-quasilinear preferences, albeit with deterministic mechanisms, which covers many problems of interest.
In a recent paper, Noldeke and Samuelson (2018) analyze the principal-agent problem and the matching problem with non-quasilinear preferences. They establish an implementation duality to characterize the implementable utility profiles, which allows them to extend results from the quasilinear domain. Our results are specific to deterministic mechanisms, which is not assumed in Noldeke and Samuelson (2018) . On the other hand, Noldeke and Samuelson (2018) impose topological assumptions on the set of alternatives to derive their results. The objectives and the results in both the papers are quite different.
There is a literature on axiomatic treatment of mechanisms in models without quasilinearity. The broad conclusion of this literature is that in a variety of problems, dominant strategy incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and efficiency (along with some other mild axioms) are incompatible without quasilinearity. The literature also identifies problems where these properties are compatible -see for instance Saitoh and Serizawa (2008); Hashimoto and Saitoh (2010) ; Morimoto and Serizawa (2015) ; Kazumura and Serizawa (2016); Zhou and Serizawa (2018); Baisa (2019, forthcoming) ; Ma et al. (2016) and references therein.
There is a literature in auction theory and algorithmic game theory on single object auctions with budget-constrained bidders -see Che and Gale (2000) ; Pai and Vohra (2014) ; Ashlagi et al. (2010) ; Lavi and May (2012) . The budget constraint in these papers introduces a particular form of non-quasilinearity in the preferences of agents. Further, the budget constraint in these models is hard, i.e., the utility from any payment above the budget is minus infinity. This assumption is not satisfied by the preferences considered in our model.
Hence, our results do not apply directly to these models.
In a companion paper (Kazumura et al., 2019) , we investigate the question of revenue maximizing auction by a seller who is selling multiple objects to agents who can buy at most one object. The minimum Walrasian equilibrium price mechanism is shown to be revenue-optimal in a class of mechanisms satisfying dominant strategy incentive compatibility, individual rationality and some other reasonable axioms.
A Sufficiency part of Theorem 1
We do the sufficiency part of Theorem 1.
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Proof : Take any (f, p) which satisfies monotonicity and posted-price property. Then, there exists a map κ : A → R such that p(R) = κ(f (R)) for all R. For any a, b ∈ A, we say incentive constraint a → b holds if for every R ∈ D with f (R) = a, we have (a, κ(a)) R (b, κ(b)).
Assume for contradiction, there exists x ∈ A and a preference R such that f (R) = x and (y , κ(y )) P (x, κ(x)) for some y ∈ A, i.e., x → y does not hold. Without loss of generality, assume that for all y with y x, incentive constraints y → b holds for all b ∈ A (in other words, x is a maximal alternative according to which can manipulate).
Let Z κ := {(y, κ(y)) : y ∈ A} be the set of consumption bundles in the range of the mechanism (f, p). Among the consumption bundles in Z κ , let (y * , κ(y * )) be a maximum according to R. Then, we have (y * , κ(y * )) P (x, κ(x)) and (y * , κ(y * )) R (y, κ(y)) for all (y, κ(y)) ∈ Z κ . The first relation implies that V R (x, (y * , κ(y * ))) < κ(x). By ontoness, there is a preference R such that f (R ) = y * . Hence, monotonicity implies that Also, since (y * , κ(y * )) R (y, κ(y)) for all (y, κ(y)) ∈ Z κ , we have
Using this, we define a vector v * ∈ R |A| as follows: for every y ∈ A, let
where > 0 but sufficiently small. An illustration of v * is provided in the indifference diagram in Figure 11 for an example with A = {a, b, x, y * , c} with a b x y * c. Now, the proof is completed in four steps.
Step 1. We will show that v * respects , but we prove a slightly general assertion, which will be useful to us in later steps. Pick any v ∈ R |A| such that v y = v * y ∀ y ∈ A \ {x} and
for sufficiently small δ > 0 with δ < -note that by Inequality (2), V
Step 4. We now define two vectors u, v ∈ R |A| as follows.
where δ > 0 but sufficiently small. Letv ∈ R |A| be such thatv x = η andv y = v * y for every y = x. By Step 3, V R (x, (y * , κ(y * ))) ≤ η =v x ≤ v * x . Hence, by
Step 1,v respects . Thus, since δ is sufficiently small, u and v also respect . By Step 3, η ≤ v * x = V R (x, (y * , κ(y * ))) + < κ(x), where the last inequality follows from Inequality (2) and the fact that is sufficiently small. Hence, η < κ(x), and using the fact that δ is sufficiently small, we get u x < κ(x) and v x < κ(x). By construction, u y * = v y * = v * y * = κ(y * ). Hence, by Lemma 5 (whose statement and proof is in Appendix B.3), we have two vectors u and v
and u y * > v y * . Now, by TP ∆ richness, there is a preference R such that u, u ∈ I( R) and there is a preference R such that v, v ∈ I( R). By
Step 2, f ( R), f ( R) ∈ {x, y * }. By definition of η and
This is a contradiction to monotonicity.
B Missing Lemmas and proofs
We give all the missing proofs in this section. We start by giving some elementary lemmas that we use throughout our proofs.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof : Fix ∆ > 0. We show that Q We now construct a new preference R as follows. Fix a 0 ∈ A. It is enough to specify V R (a, (a 0 , t)) for each t ∈ R and all a ∈ A \ {a 0 }. Let v < v be such that v and v are ∆ + -parallel. Letv >v be such thatv and v are ∆ + -parallel. For all t ∈ R and all a ∈ A \ {a 0 },
Note that for all t ∈ R, α ∈ [0, 1], and that V R (a, (a 0 , v a 0 )) = v a , and V R (a, (a 0 ,v a 0 )) = v a , and that α → 1 as t → v a 0 , α → 0 as t v a 0 , and α → 1 as t
is continuous with respect to t. Also note α → 0 as t → −∞ or t → ∞. Thus, since v < v <v <v and v,v, v andv satisfy DD, every pair of vectors in I(R) will also satisfy DD. Hence, R satisfies PIE.
Next, we complete the proof by showing that 
B.2 Lemma 4
The following technical lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 4 Suppose w, w ∈ R |A| are two vectors that respect with w > w . Then, there exists a * ∈ A and two vectors v, v ∈ R |A| that respect and are ∆ + parallel such that the following conditions hold:
η + (j − k − Finally, to show v, v satisfy DD, pick x, y ∈ A and consider the following two cases. Note that v > v .
Case 1: x, y = a * . Suppose x ∈ A j and y ∈ A h and v x > v y . Then, w x > w y and j < h. As a result, v x − v y = w x − w y − (j − h)δ > w x − w y = v x − v y .
Case 2: x = a * , y = a * . Suppose x ∈ A j . As a result,
If v x > v a * , then w x > w a * and j < k. This means that previous expression is strictly greater than v x − v a * . If v x < v a * , then since δ is sufficiently small, w x < w a * . Hence, j − k ≥ 1. As a result, the previous expression is smaller than v x − v a * . Hence, v, v satisfy DD. Further, since v y is arbitrarily close to w y − η for each y ∈ A with η > 0 and v is arbitrarily close to w, we conclude that v, v are ∆ + parallel.
B.3 Lemma 5
The following technical lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 5 Let a, b ∈ A. Suppose u, v ∈ R |A| be two vectors that respect and satisfy the following:
where η < κ(b) and δ > 0 is sufficiently small. Then, there exists u , v ∈ R |A| which respect such that the following hold. Note that x y with x ∈ A h , y ∈ A implies that h < . Suppose a ∈ A k and b ∈ A j . We consider three cases. Case 1. a b. Then, k < j. In that case, we define two vectors u and v as follows. For every ∈ {1, . . . , K} and for every x ∈ A , we define:
Since δ is sufficiently small and κ(b) > u b > v b , we have u > u and v > v. We show that u , v respect . Pick x ∈ A h and y ∈ A with x y. Hence, we have h < . Now,
δ > 0, where the strict inequality follows since u respects , and hence, u x > u y , and δ is sufficiently small. This shows that u respects . An identical argument shows that v respects . By construction, u b = v b = κ(b) and j > k implies that
So, Property (1) of the claim holds.
Finally, we show that (u, u ) are ∆ -parallel and (v, v ) are ∆ -parallel. To do so, pick
x ∈ A h and y ∈ A with x y, and hence, h < . Now, Case 2. b a. Then, k > j. In this case, we define two vectors u and v as follows. For every ∈ {1, . . . , K} and for every x ∈ A , we define: Hence, u a > v a as required by Property (1). This completes the proof of the claim for this case.
Case 3. a b and b a. In this case, we define two vectors u * and v * using u and v defined in Case 2 as follows. For every ∈ {1, . . . , K} and for every x ∈ A , we define u * as follows:
where δ > 0 is sufficiently small -in particular, δ < δ. Since u respects and δ is sufficiently small, u * also respects . Similarly, we define v * as follows:
Since v respects and δ is sufficiently small, v * also respects .
By construction u * b = v * b = κ(b). Further, u * a − v * a = 2δ > 0. Hence, Property (1) holds. We now show that (u, u * ) are ∆ -parallel. First, since u > u and u and u * are sufficiently close, u * > u. Now, pick x ∈ A h and y ∈ A with x y, and hence, h < . If a / ∈ {x, y}, then (u * x − u * y ) − (u x − u y ) = (u x − u y ) − (u x − u y ) < 0, where the inequality follows from Case 2. Suppose a = x. Then, h = k < , and we get (u * a − u * y ) − (u a − u y ) = (u a − u y ) − (u a − u y ) + δ = (k − )3δ + δ < 0, where the inequality follows since δ < δ and k < . Finally, suppose a = y. Then, h < k = .
(u * x − u * a ) − (u x − u a ) = (u x − u a ) − (u x − u a ) − δ = (h − k)3δ − δ < 0, where the inequality follows since h < k.
